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Abstract
The paper extends Diamond’s (1984) analysis of financial contract-
ing with information asymmetry ex post and endogenous ”bankruptcy
penalties” to allow for risk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of
debt contracts, which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is
shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts
with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are
optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers.
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1 Introduction
Under a standard debt contract, a borrower’s obligation to his financiers is in-
dependent of his actual returns or his ability to pay. If he cannot fulfil the
obligation, he goes bankrupt, and the financiers may confiscate his remaining
assets. The use of such contracts is commonly explained by differences in in-
formation of the borrower and his financiers about outcomes. If the borrower’s
obligation is independent of his own returns, it is easy for financiers to deter-
mine whether the obligation is being fulfilled or not. If the borrower’s obligation
depends on his returns, financiers have to ascertain what these returns actually
are. This may be difficult or costly; the use of debt avoids this difficulty.
There are two distinct formalizations of this argument. The costly state
verification approach of Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985) assumes
that the information asymmetry can be lifted if resources are spent to pro-
vide the financier with information about the borrower’s true ability to pay. If
all participants are risk neutral, an optimal contract provides for such costly
state verification if and only if the borrower cannot pay the prescribed amount;
the borrower’s remaining assets are then confiscated. This is interpreted as
”bankruptcy”.
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In contrast, Diamond (1984) assumes that the information asymmetry can-
not be lifted at all. It is however possible to use nonpecuniary ”bankruptcy
penalties” to discourage the borrower from claiming that he cannot repay the
financiers. These penalties are chosen endogenously. Their magnitude is made
to depend on the amount by which the borrower’s payment falls short of his
debt service obligation. If all participants are risk neutral, an optimal contract
in this setting also takes the form of a standard debt contract.
The apparent similarity of the two approaches disappears if the assumption
of risk neutrality is dropped. If the borrower is risk averse and only financiers
risk neutral, the costly state verification approach still yields a modified version
of a debt contract. In this modified version, the debtor has a state-independent
debt service obligation, and state verification occurs if and only if he fails to
fulfil this obligation. In the event of ”bankruptcy”, i.e., when state verification
occurs, the borrower’s assets are not entirely confiscated: He is left with a
positive living allowance. This living allowance is the same in all ”bankruptcy”
states, providing an element of insurance against the borrower’s return risk
across bankruptcy states (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)). Under
the condition of Innes (1990), that there must be no incentivefor the borrower
to destroy returns before the financiers get to verify anything, the optimal level
of this living allowance in the event of bankruptcy is actually equal to the lowest
nonbankruptcy consumption of the borrower, i.e., the consumption he has if he
can barely fulfil his debt service obligation.1
In contrast, the present paper shows that in Diamond’s (1984) approach
the optimality of debt contracts is not generally robust to the introduction of
risk aversion. The underlying incentive considerations are significantly more
complex, and an optimal incentive compatible contract should not be expected
to have a simple mathematical form. The nonlinearity of the borrower’s utility
function implies that the nonpecuniary ”bankruptcy penalty” that is required
to discourage the borrower from underreporting his ability to pay will itself be
given by a nonlinear function of the amount of underreporting. Moreover, an
optimal contract will involve an element of risk sharing as well as finance. These
two considerations interact in such a way that an optimal incentive-compatible
contract will typically not take the form of a debt contract, even a debt contract
with a positive living allowance.
The difference is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The heavy line in Figure 1
exhibits the relation between the return realization y of the borrower and his
consumption c(y) under a standard debt contract, with c(y) = 0 for y below
the repayment obligation yˆ and c(y) = y − yˆ when y exceeds the repayment
obligation. The dashed line in Figure 1 exhibits the same relation under a debt
1As pointed out by Garino and Simmons (1998), optimal contracting in the simple
Townsend-Gale-Hellwig model with risk aversion requires that the bankruptcy living allowance
have a marginal utility equal to the expected marginal utility of the borrower’s consumption
in nonbankruptcy states. This implies that the bankruptcy living allowance exceeds the lowest
nonbankruptcy consumption level of the borrower. The Innes incentive condition eliminates
this possibility, because in ”bad nonbankruptcy states” the borrower must not want to destroy
output in order to get into bankruptcy and avail himself of the bankruptcy living allowance.
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contract with a living allowance ε > 0 in the event of ”bankruptcy”. In contrast,
Figure 2 exhibits the relation between y and c(y) under an optimal contract a` la
Diamond (1984) when (i) financiers are risk neutral, (ii) the borrower exhibits
constant relative risk aversion, and (iii) the ex ante distribution of returns is
uniform over some interval [0, Y ]. For high values of y, the dependence of c(y)
on y looks similar in all three cases, but for low values of y, contracting a` la
Diamond (1984) with risk aversion looks quite different from any form of debt.
This suggests that Diamond’s model of incentive contracting with endogenous
”bankruptcy penalties” is rather less closely related to the costly state verifi-
cation literature than the parallel results on the optimality of standard debt
contracts under risk neutrality would seem to indicate.
I came across these findings when I wanted to extend Diamond’s (1984)
analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the potential
financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) had used his result on the optimal-
ity of debt contracts as an ingredient in the analysis of the conditions under
which financial intermediation is efficient in the sense that the overall agency
costs of intermediated finance are less than the agency costs of direct finance
even though intermediation lengthens the chain of transactions. This analysis
involves a diversification argument, which makes essential use of the assumption
that intermediaries are risk neutral and raises the question of robustness to the
introduction of risk aversion. On the way to answering this question, I found
that risk aversion complicates not only the diversification argument for finan-
cial intermediation, but also the underlying model of incentive contracting. This
latter complication is studied here; on the basis of this analysis, the viability
of financial intermediation with risk aversion is studied in a companion paper
(Hellwig (1998)). That paper shows that the central results of Diamond (1984)
on diversification across borrowers as a basis for intermediation are indeed ro-
bust to the introduction of risk aversion.
In the following, Section 2 develops the basic model of incentive contracting
with ex post information asymmetry and endogenous bankruptcy penalties for
a risk averse borrower. Section 3 discusses optimal contracts and explains the
economics underlying the contract exhibited in Figure 2. Proofs are presented
in the Appendix.
2 Ex Post Information Asymmetry and Incen-
tive Contracting with Nonlinear Utility
Like Diamond (1984), I consider the financing of a venture that requires a fixed
investment I > 0 and bears a random return y˜. The random variable y˜ has
a probability distribution G with a density g, which is continuous and strictly
positive on the interval [0, Y ]. The expected return of the venture is strictly
greater than the cost I, i.e., ∫ Y
0
y dG(y) > I (1)
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The owner/manager of the venture, with own funds w ≥ 0, wants to raise
external finance, either because his funds are less than the investment outlay,
or because he wants to share the risk of his venture with others.
Outside financiers know the return distribution G, but - in contrast to the
entrepreneur - they are unable to observe the realizations of the return random
variable y˜. The agency problems caused by this information asymmetry can be
reduced through the use of nonpecuniary penalties as a device to discourage mis-
reporting of return realizations. These penalties are determined endogenously
as part of the finance contract and moreover they can be made to depend on
the entrepreneur’s report about his return realization and his actual payment
to his financiers.
A finance contract is represented by a number L indicating the funds pro-
vided by outside financiers and by two functions r(.) and p(.) such that for any
z ∈ [0, Y ], r(z) is the payment to financiers and p(z) ≥ 0 is the nonpecuniary
penalty the entrepreneur suffers when he reports that his return realization is
equal to z. With outside funds L, his own financial contribution to his project
is E = I − L ≤ w. Any excess of w over E is invested in an alternative asset,
which is safe and has a gross rate of return equal to one.
Given a finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)), the entrepreneur’s consumption is
w + L− I + y − r(z) if the true return realization is y and the reported return
realization is z; the corresponding payoff realization is u(w+L− I+y− r(z))−
p(z). A contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is said to be feasible if L ≥ I − w and moreover,
w + L− I + y − r(y) ≥ 0 (2)
for all y ∈ [0, Y ], so the entrepreneur’s consumption is never negative. A con-
tract (L, r(.), p(.)) is said to be incentive compatible if it is feasible and moreover
u(w + L− I + y − r(y))− p(y) ≥ u(w + L− I + y − r(z))− p(z) (3)
for all y ∈ [0, Y ] and all z ∈ [0, Y ] such that w + L− I + y ≥ r(z), so he has no
incentive to misreport his return realization.
The utility function u(.) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave as well as twice continuously differentiable on <++; moreover, u(0) =
limc→0u(c), with the usual conventions when limc→0u(c) = −∞, e.g., when
u(.) = ln(.). Given these assumptions, standard arguments from incentive the-
ory yield:
Proposition 1 A finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)) satisfying (2) for all y ∈ [0, Y ]
is incentive compatible if and only if:
(i) the function r(.) is nondecreasing on [0, Y ] and
(ii) for all y ∈ [0, Y ],
p(y) = p(Y ) +
∫ Y
y
u′(w + L− I + x− r(x)) dr(x) (4)
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Condition (4) shows that for a given loan size L and repayment function r(.),
incentive compatibility determines the penalty function p(.) up to a constant of
integration, p(Y ). If r(.) is differentiable, this condition is actually equivalent
to the differential equation
dp
dy
= −u′(w + L− I + y − r(y)) dr
dy
, (5)
showing that as the return realization y goes down, the penalty p(y) goes up at
a rate which depends on the rate drdy at which the payment r(y) goes down as y
goes down.
As an illustration, consider the class of finance contracts (L, r(.), p(.)) such
that
r(y) = w + L− I + min(y, yˆ)− ε (6)
for some fixed ε ≥ 0 , yˆ ∈ (0, Y ), and all y ∈ [0, Y ]. Such contracts can be
interpreted as debt contracts with a minimum living allowance ε. The amount
w + L − I + yˆ − ε represents a return-independent debt service obligation. If
the entrepreneur can meet this obligation he does so and retains the excess
of his actual return y over yˆ as well as ε. If he cannot meet the obligation
w + L − I + yˆ − ε, he defaults and retains just the minimum living allowance
ε. If the minimum living allowance is zero, (6) is the repayment function for
a standard debt contract as studied by Diamond (1984) or Gale and Hellwig
(1985).
By (6), a debt contract has drdy = 0 if y > yˆ and the obligation w+L−I+yˆ−ε
is met, but drdy = 1 if y < yˆ and the entrepreneur defaults on his obligation. Thus
condition (5) entails dpdy = 0 if y > yˆ, and
dp
dy = −u′(ε) if y < yˆ; condition (4)
reduces to:
p(y) = p(Y ) + max(yˆ − y, 0) u′(ε). (7)
If ε = 0 and u′(0) = 1, (7) is exactly the condition that Diamond (1984)
gives for the incentive compatibility of a standard debt contract for the case of
risk neutrality2, requiring that the difference p(y) − p(Y ) be just equal to the
amount of money that the entrepreneur saves by paying r(y) rather than r(Y ).
For y ∈ [yˆ, Y ] of course, (6) implies r(y) = r(Y ) and hence p(y) = p(Y ). If
u′(ε) 6= 1, the money gain r(yˆ) − r(y) = yˆ − y from reporting y < yˆ rather
than yˆ under the repayment function (6) has to be weighted by u′(ε) so as to
as to make the penalty p(y) commensurate with the utility gain from reporting
2Risk neutrality is not compatible with the assumption that u(.) is strictly concave. A
careful analysis of the proof of Proposition 1 shows that this assumption is used only to
establish that incentive compatibility entails weak monotonicity of r(.). The other parts
of Proposition 1, i.e., the sufficiency of (i) and (ii) and the necessity of (ii) for incentive
compatibility, go through even if u(.) is merely weakly concave.
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y rather than yˆ and paying r(y) rather than r(yˆ). (If u′(0) is very large, this
militates against the use of a standard debt contract as opposed to one with a
minimum living allowance ε > 0.)
Turning to the choice between contracts, I note that the entrepreneur’s ex-
pected payoff from an incentive-compatible contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is equal to:∫ Y
0
u(w + L− I + y − r(y)) dG(y)−
∫ Y
0
p(y) dG(y) (8)
Upon using (4) to substitute for p(y) and integrating the resulting double inte-
gral by parts, one finds that this is equal to
∫ Y
0
u(w + L− I + y − r(y)) dG(y)
−
∫ Y
0
u′(w + L− I + y − r(y)) G(y) dr(y)− p(Y ) (9)
As for the financiers, I assume that there are enough of them dividing
the uncertain return r(y˜) among each other so that they assess the contract
(L, r(.), p(.)) as if they were risk neutral. They are only concerned as to whether
the expected gross return
∫ Y
0
r(y) dG(y) is enough to cover the opportunity cost
of their putting up the funds L. From their perspective, an incentive-compatible
finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is acceptable, if and only if∫ Y
0
r(y) dG(y) ≥ L (10)
Condition (1) ensures that the set of acceptable contracts is nonempty. An
acceptable incentive-compatible finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is called optimal
if it maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected payoff (8), respectively (9), over the
set of all acceptable incentive-compatible contracts.
In the remainder of the paper, I study the properties of optimal incentive-
compatible contracts. I begin with the observation that, as shown in (9), the
entrepreneur wants p(Y ), the penalty he suffers when he reports the maximum
possible return, to be as small as possible. As for the financiers, (10) shows
that their payoff is independent of p(Y ); moreover (4) shows that incentive
compatibility hinges on the difference p(y)−p(Y ) rather than the level of p(Y ).
Trivially then one obtains:
Remark 2 Any optimal incentive-compatible contract satisfies p(Y ) = 0.
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3 Optimal Incentive-Compatible Contracts
In view of Proposition 1, the problem of finding an optimal incentive-compatible
contract is equivalent to the problem of finding a loan size L ≥ I − w and a
nondecreasing repayment function r(.) so as to maximize (9), with p/Y ) = 0,
subject to the feasibility constraint (2) and the acceptability condition (10). It
is convenient to rewrite this problem in terms of the entrepreneur’s consumption
pattern c(.), where for any y ∈ [0, Y ],
c(y) := w + L− I + y − r(y). (11)
Since (11) implies dr(y) = dy − dc(y), the objective function (9) with p(Y ) = 0
can be rewritten as∫ Y
0
u(c(y)) g(y) dy −
∫ Y
0
u′(c(y)) G(y) dy +
∫ Y
0
u′(c(y)) G(y) dc(y). (12)
Upon combining the first and the third term and integrating, one can further
rewrite this as
u(c(Y ))−
∫ Y
0
u′(c(y)) G(y) dy. (13)
The financiers’ participation constraint (10) is similarly rewritten as:
∫ Y
0
c(y) dG(y) ≤ w − I +
∫ Y
0
y dG(y). (14)
Finally, with (4) subsumed in (9), respectively (13), feasibility and incentive
compatibility reduce to the requirements that
c(y) ≥ 0 (15)
and that r(.) be nondecreasing or, equivalently, that
c(y)− c(z) ≤ y − z (16)
for all y, z ∈ [0, Y ] such that y ≥ z. The optimal-contracting problem has
thus been reduced to the problem of choosing a function c(.) on [0, Y ] so as to
maximize (13) under the constraints (14)-(16).
Proposition 3 Under the maintained assumptions, in particular (1), an opti-
mal incentive-compatible contract exists.
Proposition 4 If c(.) corresponds to an optimal incentive-compatible contract,
then c(.) is continuous on (0, Y ]. Moreover c(Y ) > 0 and c(y) = c(Y ) + y − Y
for y sufficiently close to Y.
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An optimal contract always exhibits the feature of a debt contract whereby
for high realizations of the borrower’s return a further increase in his return
leaves his payment to the financiers unaffected, i.e., all of this increase serves
to raise his consumption. This reflects the prominence of u(c(Y )) in (13): For
return levels close to Y , it is important to have c(y) increase as much as possible
with y so as to make c(Y ) and hence u(c(Y )) large. Accordingly the consumption
patterns in Figures 1 and 2 all have a slope dcdy equal to one when the return
level y is close to the upper bound Y .
In contrast, for low realizations of the borrower’s return, an optimal contract
in the presence of risk aversion does not always exhibit the feature of a debt
contract that lenders confiscate everything ”in the event of bankruptcy”. Indeed
Propositions 6 - 8 below show that for many specifications of the borrower’s
utility function the repayment owed to lenders is insensitive to the borrower’s
return realization when the latter is low as well as when it is high, and the
borrower’s consumption c(y) is bounded away from zero.
The analysis uses control-theoretic methods. If c(.) was known to be abso-
lutely continuous, the problem of maximizing (13) under the constraints (14) -
(16) could be formulated as a standard optimum-control problem with control
v(y) := dcdy (y) and (16) equivalent to the requirement that v(y) ≤ 1 for all y.
The assumptions here do not actually guarantee this. Even so, the consump-
tion pattern induced by an optimal contract must satisfy a suitable analogue of
Pontryagin’s conditions. This is the point of:
Proposition 5 Let c(.) correspond to an optimal incentive-compatible contract.
Then there exist a scalar µ > 0 and a continuously differentiable real-valued
function ψ(.) on [0, Y ] such that for all y ∈ [0, Y ],
dψ
dy
≤ u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y), with equality if c(y) > 0, (17)
ψ(y) ≥ 0, with equality unless in a neighbourhood of y (18)
c(.) is continuously differentiable with
dc
dy
= 1,
ψ(Y ) = u′(c(Y )), (19)
ψ(0) = 0. (20)
If u′′(.) is a strictly increasing function, these conditions are sufficient as well
as necessary for c(.) to maximize (13) under the constraints (14)-(16); in this
case, the optimal contract is unique in the sense that consumption patterns cor-
responding to different optimal contracts all coincide on (0, Y ].
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It is instructive to consider the case of constant absolute risk aversion. In this
case, as in the more general case of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, u′′(.)
is automatically a strictly increasing function, so the maximand (13) is strictly
concave in c(.), and the last part of Proposition 5 applies, i.e., the consumption
pattern corresponding to an optimal contract is completely characterized by the
Pontryagin conditions (17)-(20). This yields:
Proposition 6 Assume that u(.) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, i.e.,
that u(c) ≡ −e−δc for some δ > 0. Assume further that the distribution G(.)
is uniform, i.e., that g(y) ≡ 1/Y , and let c(., δ) be the consumption pattern
corresponding to an optimal incentive-compatible contract.
(a) If δ is sufficiently close to zero, then c(., δ) has the form shown in Figure
1, i..e.,
c(y, δ) = max(w − I, 0) + max(0, y − yˆ), (21)
where yˆ ∈ [0, Y ) is chosen so that (14) holds with equality.
(b) If δ is sufficiently large, then c(., δ) has the form shown in Figure 2, i.e.,
c(0, δ) > 0, and there exist y1(δ), y2(δ) ∈ (0, Y ) such that
dc
dy
= 1 if y < y1(δ) or y > y2(δ) (22)
and
c(y, δ) = c(y1, δ) + δ−1[ln y − ln y1(δ)] if y1(δ) ≤ y ≤ y2(δ). (23)
Moreover as δ goes out of bounds, y1(δ) converges to zero, y2(δ) converges to
Y , and c(., δ) converges to the constant function with value w − I + ∫ y dG(y),
uniformly on [0, Y ].
With constant absolute risk aversion, a standard debt contract is optimal if
risk aversion is close to zero, but not if risk aversion is large. To understand
the economics behind this result, go back to the borrower’s objective function
as specified in (12) and rewrite this in the form∫ Y
0
u(c(y)) g(y) dy −
∫ Y
0
u′(c(y)) G(y) (1− v(y)) dy (24)
where, for any y, v(y) := dcdy . (In the constellation of Proposition 6 this is
actually legitimate.) In the case of risk neutrality, with u(c) ≡ c and u′(c) ≡ 1,
(24) simplifies to ∫ Y
0
c(y) g(y) dy −
∫ Y
0
G(y) (1− v(y)) dy. (25)
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An optimal contract must obviously satisfy (14) with equality. In the case of
risk neutrality, this fixes the first term in (25) as w−I+∫ ydG, regardless of any
other aspect of the consumption pattern c(.). The shape of c(.) is then chosen
solely with a view to minimizing the expected value
∫ Y
0
G(y) (1 − v(y)) dy of
nonpecuniary penalties. If w ≥ I, this requires v(y) = 1 for all y; if w < I, it
requires that v(y) = 1 if G(y) is large and v(y) = c(y) = 0 if G(y) is small. This
explains Diamond’s (1984) result on the optimality of standard debt under risk
neutrality.3
The appearance of the weights G(y) in the expressions for expected nonpecu-
niary penalties in (25) reflects the fact that the incentive compatibility condition
(4) relates changes in p(.) to changes in r(.). If drdy = 1 − v(y) is positive over
some interval (y −∆, y], the increase in penalties as one goes from y to y −∆
affects the level of penalties not just at y − ∆, but at all return levels y′ < y
(to discourage the entrepreneur from misreporting y′ instead of y − ∆). This
explains why the ”increase” dr = (1−v(y)) dy enters (25) with the weight G(y)
of the set of all return levels less than y. Given this appearance of the weights
G(y) in (25), under risk neutrality it is desirable to concentrate the deviations
of v(y) from one at low levels of y.
A simple comparison of (24) and (25) shows that this argument for the
optimality of debt contracts is heavily dependent on the assumption of risk
neutrality. If the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.) is strictly
concave, two additional considerations must be taken into account: First, when
the borrower is risk averse, the first term in (24) depends on the riskiness as
well as the mean of the random variable c(y˜) = w + L − I + y˜ − r(y˜). If
u′(c) is large when c is close to zero, this militates against c(y˜) being zero with
positive probability. Secondly, the weight with which ”the increase” dr enters
the expected value of the nonpecuniary penalties in the last term in (24) depends
on u′(c(y)) as well as G(y), the point being that the nonpecuniary penalties have
to compensate for utility gains from false reporting, not just the money gains. If
marginal utility is large, a given money gain from false reporting may translate
into a large utility gain, requiring a large penalty to keep the borrower honest.
Whereas under risk neutrality, expected nonpecuniary penalties are minimized
by concentrating the increases of r(.) at those return levels where G(y) is small,
with risk aversion, they are minimized by concentrating them at those return
levels where u′(c(y))G(y) is small. This need not be where y is small.
The consumption pattern in Figure 2 reflects these considerations. In Figure
2, in contrast to Figure 1, the slope v(y) = dcdy is equal to one for very low as well
as very high values of y; this reflects the possibility that the weight u′(c(y))G(y)
of the term (1−v(y)) in (24) may be large if c(y) is small and u′(c(y)) is large. In
an intermediate range in Figure 2, v(y) = dcdy lies strictly between zero and one,
reflecting a tradeoff at the margin between considerations of risk sharing (calling
for a low value of v(y)), the need to repay the financiers (again calling for a low
3Alternatively, the reader may observe that under risk neutrality, (13) takes the form
c(Y ) − R G(y)dy, which is maximal if c(Y ) is maximal, which in turn is the case when c(.)
takes the form (21), see Lemma 9 in the Appendix.
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value of v(y)) and the desire to keep nonpecuniary penalties low (calling for a
high value of v(y)).
The important point is that in the presence of risk aversion the finance con-
tract provides for risk sharing as well as finance. Even if w ≥ I, i.e., if the
entrepreneur is able to finance his project on his own, he may still want to bring
in an external investor as this enables him to maintain his consumption when
project returns are low. He has to pay for this insurance in terms of nonpecu-
niary penalties, but depending on his risk preferences and on the distribution
of returns, he may well find this worthwhile. This is, e.g., always the case in
the constellation of Proposition 6 when δ is large; in this case, regardless of
the relation of w and I, an optimal incentive-compatible contract will provide
the entrepreneur with a consumption pattern close to the nonrandom constant
w − I + ∫ ydG(y).
More generally, for the case of constant absolute risk aversion, Proposition
6 shows that risk sharing considerations play no role if risk aversion is low, but
entail the nonoptimality of debt contracts if risk aversion is high. For other util-
ity functions, risk sharing considerations always preclude the optimality of debt
contracts if u′(c) becomes large as c becomes small, e.g., if the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. This is
shown in:
Proposition 7 Let c(.) correspond to an optimal incentive-compatible contract.
If limc→0 u′(c) = ∞, then c(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (0, Y ]. If limc→∞ u′′(c)c = −∞,
then c(0) > 0 and v(y) = 1 for any y that is sufficiently close to 0.
Proposition 8 Assume that u(.) exhibits constant relative risk aversion, i.e.,
that u′(y) ≡ cδ−1 for some δ < 1. Assume further that the distribution function
G(.) is uniform, i.e., that g(y) ≡ 1/Y , and let c(.) be the consumption pattern
corresponding to an optimal incentive-compatible contract. If w < I, then c(.)
has the form shown in Figure 2, i.e., c(0) > 0, and there exist y1, y2 ∈ (0, Y )
such that
dc
dy
= 1 if y < y1 or y > y2 (26)
and
c(y) = c(y1)(y/y1)1/(2−δ) if y1 ≤ y ≤ y2. (27)
For other specifications of utility and distribution functions, yet more com-
plicated finance contracts may be optimal. To see this, note that if v(y) = dcdy
is not equal to one, then, by (18), the costate variable ψ(.) must have a local
minimum at y. If in addition c(y) > 0, then by (17), one must have
u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y) = 0. (28)
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This equation represents the tradeoff at the margin mentioned above that un-
derlies an interior choice of v(y) = dcdy . If u
′′(.) is a strictly increasing function,
(28) can be rewritten as
c(y) = u′′
−1
(−µ g(y)
G(y)
). (29)
Using (29), one easily verifies that if u′′(.) is strictly increasing and g(.)/G(.) is
nondecreasing, then the consumption pattern c(.) that corresponds to an opti-
mal incentive-compatible contract is nondecreasing. Otherwise, e.g., if u′′(.) is
increasing and the hazard rate function g(.)/G(.) is not everywhere nondecreas-
ing, c(.) may be decreasing somewhere. Moreover, depending on the slope of
the function u′′
−1
(−µg(.)/G(.)), the number of switches back and forth between
intervals where dcdy takes an interior value and intervals where
dc
dy = 1 may be
arbitrarily large. Optimal incentive-compatible contracts are thus very sensitive
to the specification of the functions u′′(.) and g(.)/G(.).
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose first that a finance contract satisfies
conditions (i) and (ii) of the proposition. For any y ∈ [0, Y ] and any z ∈ [0, Y ]
such that r(z) ∈ w + L− I + y, one then has, from (4)
u(w + L− I + y − r(y))− p(y)− [u(w + L− I + y − r(z))− p(z)]
= −
∫ r(y)
r(z)
u′(w + L− I + y − r) dr +
∫ y
z
u′(w + L− I + x− r(x)) dr(x)
(A.1)
If z < y, concavity of u(.) implies u′(w+L−I+x−r(x)) ≥ u′(w+L−I+y−r(x))
for all x ∈ [z, y]. By the monotonicity of r(.), one then has:
∫ y
z
u′(w + L− I + x− r(x)) dr(x) ≥
∫ y
z
u′(w + L− I + y − r(x)) dr(x)
=
∫ r(y)
r(z)
u′(w + L− I + y − r) dr
which means that (A.1) implies (3). Alternatively, if z > y, concavity of u(.)
implies u′(w+L− I +x− r(x)) ≤ u′(w+L− I + y− r(x)) for all x ∈ [y, z]. By
the monotonicity of r(.), one then has:
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∫ z
y
u′(w + L− I + x− r(x)) dr(x) ≤ −
∫ z
y
u′(w + L− I + y − r(x)) dr(x)
=
∫ r(z)
r(y)
u′(w + L− I + y − r) dr
and again (A.1) implies (3). This shows that any finance contract which satisfies
assertions (i) and (ii) in the proposition is incentive-compatible.
Conversely, suppose that a contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is incentive-compatible.
Let 0 ≤ y1 < y2 ≤ Y . Apply the incentive compatibility condition (1) once
with y = y2 and z = y1, and, assuming that r(y2) ≤ w+L− I + y1,4 once with
y = y1 and z = y2, and add the resulting inequalities.
This yields
u(w + L− I + y2 − r(y2)) + u(w + L− I + y1 − r(y1))
≥ u(w + L− I + y2 − r(y1)) + u(w + L− I + y1 − r(y2))
or, after a rearrangement of terms,∫ y2
y1
u′(w + L− I + x− r(y2)) dx ≥
∫ y2
y1
u′(w + L− I + x− r(y1)) dx
Given that u(.) is strictly concave, this inequality implies r(y2) ≥ r(y1), proving
that r(.) is nondecreasing on [0, Y ].
To prove that the contract also satisfies (4), note that for any y ∈ [0, Y ] and
x < y , (3) implies
p(y)− p(x) ≤ u(w + L− I + y − r(y))− u(w + L− I + y − r(x))
= −
∫ r(y)
r(x)
u′(w + L− I + y − r) dr
≤ −
∫ r(y)
r(x)
u′(w + L− I + x− r) dr (A.2)
For any y∗ ∈ [0, Y ] and any sequence {yi}ni=1 with y1 = y∗ < y2 < ... < yn = Y ,
a repeated application of (A.2) with y = yi, x = yi−1, i = 2, ..., n, yields
p(Y )− p(y∗) ≤ −
n∑
i=2
∫ r(yi)
r(yi−1)
u′(w + L− I + yi−1 − r) dr (A.3)
4If r(x2) > w + L− I + x1, the desired result, namely r(x2) ≥ r(x1), is trivial.
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Further, a precisely parallel argument, based on incentive compatibility relative
to upward deviations in reports, yields
p(Y )− p(y∗) ≥ −
n−1∑
i=1
∫ r(yi)
r(yi−1)
u′(w + L− I + yi − r) dr (A.4)
Given that the right-hand sides of (A.3) and (A.4) are just the approximating
sums for the Stieltjes integral in (4), the validity of (4) follows immediately.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 9 Define c0(.) so that for any y ∈ [0, Y ],
c0(y) = c0(0) + max(0, y − yˆ), (A.5)
where c0(0) = w − I and yˆ = 0 if w ≥ I, c0(0) = 0 and yˆ is chosen so that
(14) holds with equality if w < I. Then c0(Y ) > c(Y ) for any c(.) 6= c0(.) that
satisfies (14)-(16).
Proof. Suppose that there is a consumption pattern c(.) that satisfies (14)-
(16) and c(Y ) ≥ c0(Y ). Since (16) implies c(y) ≥ c(Y ) − Y + y for all y ≤ Y ,
this pattern satisfies c(y) ≥ c0(Y ) − Y + y for all y ≤ Y . By the definition of
c0(.), this implies c(y) ≥ c0(y) for all y ≤ Y, if w ≥ I, and c(y) ≥ c0(y) for all
y ∈ [yˆ, Y ], if w < I. In the latter case, moreover, (15) implies c(y) ≥ c0(y) for
all y ≤ yˆ, so if w < I one also has c(y) ≥ c0(y) for all y ≤ Y. Given that c0(.)
satisfies (14) with equality, it follows that c(.) satisfies (14) only if c(.) = c0(.).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given (1), the constant function with value
K := w − I +
∫
ydG(y) > 0 (A.6)
satisfies (14)-(16) so the set of functions c(.) satisfying these constraints is
nonempty. Lemma 9 implies that on this set the objective function (13) is
bounded above by u(c0(Y )). Therefore the objective function (13) has a supre-
mum u∗ on this set. Given that the constant function with value K satisfies
(14)-(16), u∗ ≥ u(K) − u′(K)Y, so u∗ is finite. Let {ck(.)} be a sequence of
functions satisfying (14)-(16) such that u(ck(Y ))− ∫ u′(ck(y))G(y)dy converges
to u∗ as k goes out of bounds. Using the sequence {ck(.)}, I construct a ”limit
function” c(.) that satisfies (14)-(16) and u(c(Y ))− ∫ u′(c(y))G(y)dy = u∗.
I use a variation of the well known argument that is used for Helly’s Selection
Theorem (see, e.g., Billingsley (1968). First for any y > 0, the sequence {ck(y)}
is uniformly bounded. To see this, note that for any y > 0 and any k, (16) and
(15) imply ck(z) ≥ ck(y)− y for z ≤ y and ck(z) ≥ 0 for z > y. By (14) it then
follows that
ck(y) G(y)− y G(y) ≤ w − I +
∫
z g(z) dz
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and hence that
ck(y) ≤ y + (w − I +
∫
z g(z) dz)
G(y)
,
uniformly in k.
Next, let {yi} be a countable dense subset of the interval (0, Y ]. Given that
for each i the sequence {ck(yi)} is uniformly bounded, taking subsequences if
necessary, one may suppose that each of the sequences {ck(yi)}, i = 1, 2, ...,
converges to a limit c(yi). The function c(.) that is thus defined on the set {yi}
may be extended to the entire interval [0, Y ] by setting
c(y) = sup lim
n
c(yin)
where the supremum is taken over all sequences {yin} in {yi} that converge
to y. Given that the functions ck(.), k = 1, 2, ..., all satisfy (15) and (16),
one easily verifies that the function c(.) also satisfies (15) and (16), and that
c(y)=limk ck(y) for any continuity point y of c(.). By construction, c(.) is up-
per semi-continuous. In view of (16) this implies that c(.) is left-continuous
and that any discontinuity point y of c(.) satisfies c(y) > limy′↘y c(y′). This
in turn implies that c(.) has at most countably many discontinuity points, so
the set of continuity points of c(.) and hence the set of points on which {ck(y)}
converges to c(y) and {u′(ck(y))} converges to u′(c(y)) has full measure. By
Fatou’s Lemma, it follows that the validity of (14) for ck(.), k = 1, 2, ..., entails
the validity of (14) for c(.) and moreover that
u(c(Y ))−
∫
u′(c(y)) G(y) dy
= lim
yi→Y
lim
k→∞
u(ck(yi))−
∫
lim
k→∞
u′(ck(y)) G(y) dy
≥ lim
k→∞
[u(ck(Y ))−
∫
u′(ck(y)) G(y) dy] = u∗
By the definition of u∗, it follows that u(c(Y ))−∫ u′(c(y)) G(y) dy = u∗ so that
the supremum of (13) on the set of functions satisfying (14)-(16) is actually
attained at c(.), and hence is a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose first that c(.) is not continuous on (0, Y ].
If c(.) is not continuous at Y , then, by (16), one must have limy′↗Y c(y′) > c(Y ),
and an increase in c(Y ) will raise the value of (13) without affecting the validity
of (14) - (16). If c(.) is not continuous on (0, Y ), then, again by (16), there
exists y ∈ (0, Y ) such that limy′↗y c(y′) > limy′↘y c(y′), and, by the strict
monotonicity of u′(.), limy′↗y u′(c(y′)) < limy′↘y u′(c(y′)). But then a small
reduction in c(y′) for y′ belonging to a small interval to the left of y, combined
with a suitably chosen small increase in c(y′) for y′ belonging to a small interval
to the right of y, will raise the value of (13) without affecting the validity of
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(14) - (16). The assumption that c(.) is not continuous on (0, Y ] thus leads to
a contradiction and must be false.
To prove that c(Y ) > 0, I note that, by standard arguments, there exists
a Lagrange multiplier µ such that if c(.) maximizes (13) under the constraints
(14)-(16), then c(.) also maximizes
u(c(Y ))−
∫ Y
0
u′(c(y)) G(y) dy + µ (K −
∫ Y
0
c(y) g(y) dy) (A.7)
under the constraints (15) and (16); the constant K in (A.7) is again given by
(A.6). Since both u(.) and −u′(.) are strictly increasing functions, µ must be
strictly positive. For any ε > 0, consider the consumption pattern cˆε(.) such
that cˆε(y) = c(y) if y ≤ Y − ε and cˆε(y) = c(Y − ε) + y − Y + ε if y ≥ Y − ε.
Clearly, cˆε(.) satisfies (15) and (16), and so does cˆλε (.) = (1− λ)c(.) + λcˆε(.) for
any λ ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that for any ε > 0 the derivative
d
dλ
[u(cˆλε (Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(cˆλε (y)) G(y) + µ cˆ
λ
ε (y) g(y))dy]
must be nonpositive at λ = 0, and one must have
u′(c(Y ))(ε+ c(Y − ε)− c(Y ))
−
∫ Y
Y−ε
(u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y))(y − Y + ε+ c(Y − ε)− c(y))dy ≤ 0.
Since u′′(c(y)) < 0 for all y and, by (16), 0 ≤ y − Y + ε + c(Y − ε) − c(y) ≤
ε+ c(Y − ε)− c(Y ) for all y ∈ [Y − ε, Y ], it follows that ,
[u′(c(Y ))− µ(1−G(Y − ε))](ε+ c(Y − ε)− c(Y )) ≤ 0 (A.8)
for any ε > 0. However if ε is close to zero, [u′(c(Y ))−µ(1−G(Y − ε))] > 0, so
(A.8) must imply c(Y ) = ε + c(Y − ε) ≥ ε > 0. For y = Y − ε close to Y, this
in turn yields c(y) = c(Y ) + y − Y. The second statement of the proposition is
thereby proved.
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove Proposition 5, I note that the con-
sumption pattern c(.) has a Lebesgue decomposition
c(.) = cA(.) + cS(.) + cD(.)
into an absolutely continuous function cA(.), a singular, continuous function
cS(.), and a jump function cD(.). This follows from the observation that the
repayment function r(.) that corresponds to c(.) is nondecreasing and therefore
has a Lebesgue decomposition
r(.) = rA(.) + rS(.) + rD(.)
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into an absolutely continuous function rA(.), a singular, continuous function
rS(.), and a jump function rD(.). These three functions are all nondecreasing;
moreover there is no loss of generality in assuming that rS(0) = rD(0) = 0.
The corresponding decomposition of c(.) is given by setting cA(y) ≡ y − rA(y),
cS(y) ≡ −rS(y), and cD(y) ≡ −rD(y); the continuity of c(.) established in
Proposition 4 implies cD(y) ≡ −rD(y) ≡ 0. As for cS(.) and cA(.), the mono-
tonicity of rS(.) and rA(.) implies that cS(.) is nonincreasing and that the
(Radon-Nikodym) derivative v(.) of cA(.) satisfies
v(y) ≤ 1 for all y ∈ [0, Y ]. (A.9)
Now let µ > 0 again be the Lagrange multiplier in (A.7) and consider the
control problem
max
F (.),f(.)
[u(c(Y ) + F (Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(c(y) + F (y))G(y) + µ(c(y) + F (y))g(y)) dy]
(A.10)
with the constraints
c(y) + F (y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [0, Y ], (A.11)
dF
dy
= f(y) for all y ∈ [0, Y ], (A.12)
and
f(y) ≤ 1− v(y) for all y ∈ [0, Y ]. (A.13)
I claim that the pair (F0(.), f0(.)) with F0(y) ≡ f0(y) ≡ 0 solves this control
problem. Given (A.9), clearly (F0(.), f0(.)) satisfies the constraints (A.11)-
(A.13). Moreover for any pair (F (.), f(.)) that satisfies (A.11)-(A.13) one
easily finds that the consumption pattern cˆF (.) := c(.)+F (.) satisfies (15), and,
for any y, z ∈ [0, Y ] such that y ≥ z,
cˆF (y)− cˆF (z) = c(y)− c(z) + F (y)− F (z)
=
∫ y
z
v(x) dx+ cS(y)− cS(z) +
∫ y
z
f(x) dx
≤
∫ y
z
v(x) dx+
∫ y
z
(1− v(x)) dx
≤ y − z,
i.e. cˆF (.) also satisfies (16). Given that c(.) maximizes (A.7) under the con-
straints (15)-(16), it follows that
u(c(Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(c(y)) G(y) + µ c(y) g(y)) dy
≥ u(cˆF (Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(cˆF (y)) G(y) + µ cˆF (y) g(y)) dy
= u(c(Y ) + F (Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(c(y) + F (y)) G(y) + µ(c(y) + F (y)) g(y)) dy
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for any pair (F (.), f(.)) satisfying (A.11)-(A.13), and hence that (F0(.), f0(.))
maximizes (A.10) under the constraints (A.11)-(A.13).
Pontryagin’s maximum principle now implies the existence of a continuously
differentiable real-valued function ψ(.) such that for all y ∈ [0, Y ],
dψ
dy
(y) ≤ u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y),with equality unless c(y) = 0, (A.14)
f0(y) = 0 ∈ arg max
f≤1−v(y)
ψ(y) f ; (A.15)
moreover, since c(Y ) > 0, one has the transversality conditions
ψ(Y ) = u′(c(Y )) (A.16)
and
ψ(0) ≤ 0, with equality unless c(0) = 0. (A.17)
Note that (A.14) and (A.16) are the same as (17) and (19). Further, (A.15)
implies
ψ(y) ≥ 0, with equality unless v(y) = 1. (A.18)
To establish (18), it is therefore necessary and sufficient to show that if ψ(y) > 0,
then in a neighbourhood of y the singular component cS(.) of c(.) is constant.
For this purpose, note that cA(.), the absolutely continuous component of c(.),
satisfies (15) and (16), and so does cˆλ(.) = (1 − λ) c(.) + λ cA(.), for any
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Given that c(.) maximizes (A.7) subject to (15) and (16), it follows
that the derivative
d
dλ
[
u(cˆλ(Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′(cˆλ(y)) G(y) + µ cˆλ(y) g(y)) dy
]
must be nonpositive at λ = 0 , or that
u′(c(Y ))(−cS(Y ))−
∫ Y
0
(u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y))(−cS(y)) dy ≤ 0. (A.19)
Upon adding
∫ Y
0
dψ
dy (−cS(y))dy−ψ(Y )(−cS(Y ))+
∫ Y
0
ψ(y)d(−cS(y)) = 0 to the
left-hand side and rearranging terms, using (A.16) and the fact that cS(0) = 0,
one can rewrite (A.19) as ∫ Y
0
ψ(y) d(−cS(y))
−
∫ Y
0
[u′′(c(y)) G(y) + µ g(y)− dψ
dy
(y)](−cS(y))dy ≤ 0. (A.20)
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Given that cS(.) is nonincreasing and cS(0) = 0, (A.14) implies that the last
term on the left-hand side is nonnegative, hence∫ Y
0
ψ(y) d(−cS(y)) ≤ 0. (A.21)
Since cS(.) is nonincreasing, (A.21) can only hold if cS(.) is constant in the
neighbourhood of any point y satisfying ψ(y) > 0. (18) is thereby proved. As
for (20), this follows trivially from (A.15) and (A.18).
To complete the proof of Proposition 5, assume that u′′(.) is a strictly in-
creasing function. Then −u′(.) is a strictly concave function, and (13) defines
a strictly concave functional on the set of consumption plans c(.). Since the
set of plans satisfying (14)-(16) is convex, the optimal c(.) is unique up to a
set of measure zero; given the continuity property established in Proposition
4, the optimal c(.) in fact is unique up to the possible discontinuity at y = 0.
Sufficiency of Pontryagin’s conditions for characterizing this optimal c(.) follows
as in Theorem 1, p. 141, of Mangasarian (1966).
Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Given the consumption pattern specified in
(21), set µ = µˆ(δ) and ψ(.) = ψˆ(., δ) where
µˆ(δ) =
1 + δyˆ − e−δ(Y−yˆ+c(0))
Y − yˆ (A.22)
and for any y ∈ [0, Y ],
ψˆ(y, δ) = 0 if y < yˆ, (A.23)
ψˆ(y, δ) = [(1 + δy)e−δ(y−yˆ+c(0)) − (1 + δyˆ)e−δc(0) + µ(y − yˆ)]/Y
if y ≥ yˆ. (A.24)
For y < yˆ, (A.23) implies
dψ
dy
(y) =
∂ψˆ
∂y
(y, δ) = 0 ≤ −δ2 y
Y
+ µˆ(δ)
1
Y
= u′′(0)G(y) + µg(y)
if δ is sufficiently small so that δ2yˆ ≤ µˆ(δ). For y > yˆ, (A.24) implies
dψ
dy
(y) =
∂ψˆ
∂y
(y, δ) = −δ2e−d(y−yˆ+c(0)) y
Y
+ µˆ(δ)
1
Y
= u′′(c(y))G(y) + µg(y).
In either case, (17) is verified. For y > yˆ, (A.24) and (A.22), also imply
limδ→0 ∂ψˆ∂y (y, δ) = limδ→0 µˆ(δ)/Y = 1/(Y − yˆ)Y, uniformly in y. Hence, if δ
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is sufficiently small, one has ψ(y) = ψˆ(y, δ) > 0 for all y > yˆ. In combination
with (A.23), this shows that the given c(.), µ, and ψ(.) also satisfy (18) if δ is
sufficiently small. As for (19) and (20), these are obviously implied by (A.22)
and (A.24). Part (a) of the proposition therefore follows from the last part of
Proposition 5 and the observation that u′′(c) = −δ2e−δc is strictly increasing in
c.
(b) To prove part (b), I begin by specifying the critical values y1(δ), y2(δ) for
the kinks in the consumption pattern c(., δ). By standard calculus arguments,
there exists a unique z1 > 1 such that
ez1 = 1 + z1 + z21 . (A.25)
For any X ≥ 3, there exists z2(X) ∈ (1,X) such that
z2(X) =
1− e−(X−z2(X))
X − z2(X)− 1 . (A.26)
(The function z3 → f(z3) := z3 + (1 − e−z3)/(z3 − 1) ranges between +∞
and 3 − e−2 as z3 ranges from 1 to 2, so put z2(X) = maxz3∈f−1(X)∩[1,2](1 −
e−z3)/(z3 − 1).) For δ ≥ 3/Y, put
y1(δ) = z1/δ (A.27)
and
y2(δ) = z2(δY )/δ. (A.28)
From (A.27), one has limδ→∞ y1(δ) = 0. From (A.26) and the fact that z2(X) >
1 for X ≥ 3, one also has limX→∞ (X − z2(X)) = 1, so (A.28) implies
limδ→∞ δ(Y − y2(δ)) = 1, hence limδ→∞ y2(δ) = Y. In particular, one has
0 < y1(δ) < y2(δ) < Y if δ is sufficiently large.
Let δ be such that 0 < y1(δ) < y2(δ) < Y, and, for any parametrically given
µ > 0, consider the consumption pattern cˆ(., δ, µ) such that
cˆ(y, δ, µ) =
1
δ
ln(δy1(δ)) + y − y1(δ)− 1
δ
ln(µ/δ) if y < y1(δ), (A.29)
cˆ(y, δ, µ) =
1
δ
ln(δy)− 1
δ
ln(µ/δ) if y ∈ (y1(δ), y2(δ)), (A.30)
cˆ(y, δ, µ) =
1
δ
ln(δy2(δ)) + y − y2(δ)− 1
δ
ln(µ/δ) if y > y2(δ). (A.31)
Given the monotonicity of cˆ(., δ, µ) in µ, there exists a unique µ(δ) such that∫
cˆ(y, δ, µ(δ)) dG(y) = K (A.32)
where K > 0 is again given by (A.6). I claim that for any sufficiently large δ the
consumption pattern c(., δ) := cˆ(., δ, µ(δ)) corresponds to an optimal incentive-
compatible contract.
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To establish this claim, I first show that if δ is sufficiently large, then c(., δ)
satisfies the constraints (14)-(16). (14) holds trivially, by the definition of µ(δ).
As for (15), I note that (A.27)-(A.31) imply
−y1(δ) ≤ c(y, δ) + 1
δ
ln(µ(δ)/δ) ≤ 1
δ
ln(δY ) + Y − y2(δ)
for all y and δ, hence
lim
δ→∞
[
c(y, δ) +
1
δ
ln(µ(δ)/δ)
]
= 0,
uniformly in y. From (A.32) this implies limδ→∞ 1δ ln(µ(δ)/δ) = K and hence
limδ→∞ c(y, δ) = K, uniformly in y. Since K > 0, it follows that c(y, δ) > 0,
confirming (15) for all y if δ is sufficiently large. Finally, (A.27)-(A.31) imply
that dcdy = 1 if y < y1(δ) or y > y2(δ), and
dc
dy =
1
δy ≤ 1δy1(δ) = 1z1 < 1 if
y ∈ (y1(δ), y2(δ)), so (16) holds as well.
To show that c(., δ) := cˆ(., δ, µ(δ)) is actually optimal, I specify the costate
variable ψ(.) = ψˆ(., δ) where
ψˆ(y, δ) =
[
(1 + δy)e−δ(y−y1(δ)) − eδy1(δ) + δ2y1(δ)y
] µ(δ)
δ2y1(δ)Y
if y < y1(δ), (A.33)
ψˆ(y, δ) = 0 if y ∈ (y1(δ), y2(δ)), (A.34)
ψˆ(y, δ) =
[
(1 + δy)e−δ(y−y2(δ)) − 1− δy2(δ) + δ2y2(δ)(Y − y2(δ))
] µ(δ)
δ2y2(δ)Y
if y > y2(δ). (A.35)
Given the conditions (A.25)-(A.28) for y1(δ) and y2(δ), it is straightforward to
check that the consumption pattern c(., δ), the Lagrange multiplier µ(δ), and
the costate variable ψ(.) = ψˆ(., δ) defined by (A.33)-(A.35) satisfy conditions
(17)-(20). As in part (a) of the proposition, the optimality of the consump-
tion pattern c(., δ) for any sufficiently high δ now follows from the last part of
Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let limc→0 u′(c) =∞. If c(y) = 0 for a nonnull
set of return levels y ∈ [0, Y ], then the integral in (13) is undefined and one
cannot be at a maximum of (13) under the constraints (14)-(16). Therefore one
must have c(y) > 0 for all but a null set of return levels y ∈ [0, Y ]. Suppose that,
contrary to the first statement of the proposition, c(y′) = 0 for some y′ > 0.
Then there exists a sequence {yk} converging to y′ from below such that the
associated sequence {c(yk)} converges to c(y′) = 0 monotonically from above
and moreover v(yk) < 1 for all k. By (18), it follows that ψ(yk) = 0 for all k
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and hence that dψdy (y
′) = 0, which is incompatible with (17). This proves the
first statement of the proposition.
Next impose the stronger assumption that limc→∞ u′′(c)c = −∞. To prove
the second statement of the proposition, I first show that this assumption implies
ψ(y) > 0 and hence, by (18), dcdy = 1 for any y that is sufficiently close to
zero. For suppose that this claim is false. Then there exists a sequence {yk}
converging to zero such that ψ(yk) = 0 for all k. Then (18) implies that for
each k, ψ(.) has a local minimum at yk, i.e., one must have
dψ
dy
(yk) = 0 (A.36)
for all k. Since limc→∞ u′′(c)c = −∞ implies limc→0 u′(c) = ∞, for each k one
must also have c(yk) > 0. By (17), it follows that (A.36) entails
u′′(c(yk)) G(yk) + µg(yk) = 0 (A.37)
for all k. Since g(.) is continuous and strictly positive on [0, Y ], and moreover
limk→∞G(yk) = 0, it follows that limk→∞ u′′(c(yk)) = −∞ and hence that
c(0) = limk→∞ c(yk) = 0. From (16), this implies c(yk) ≤ yk for all k. However
upon rewriting (A.37) in the form
u′′(c(yk))c(yk)
yk
c(yk)
G(yk)
yk
+ µg(yk) = 0 (A.38)
and using l’Hospital’s rule, one also finds that limk→∞ u′′(c(yk))c(yk) = −∞
implies limk→∞(yk/c(yk)) = 0 and hence that yk < c(yk) for any sufficiently
large k. The assumption that there exists a sequence {yk} converging to zero
such that ψ(yk) = 0 for all k has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
This proves that ψ(y) > 0 and dcdy (y) = 1 for any y that is sufficiently close to
zero.
By Proposition 5, this latter conclusion in turn implies that
0 < ψ(y) = ψ(y)− ψ(0) ≤
∫ y
0
[u′′(c(0) + x) G(x) + µ g(x)] dx (A.39)
for any y that is sufficiently close to zero. Now (A.39) implies
−g
¯
∫ y
0
u′′(c(0) + x) x dx ≤ µ g¯ y (A.40)
where g
¯
and g¯ are the minimum and the maximum, respectively, of the density
g(.) on [0, Y ]. If (A.40) is to hold for any y that is sufficiently close to zero, it
follows that −u′′(c(0) + x)x must be uniformly bounded even as x is close to
zero. Under the assumption that limc→0 u′′(c)c = −∞, this is possible only if
c(0) > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since limc→0 cδ−1 = ∞ and limc→0 u′′(c)c =
(δ − 1)cδ−1 = −∞, Proposition 7 implies c(0) > 0 and dcdy (y) = 1 for y close to
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zero. Since w < I, (14) implies that c(y′) < y′ for some y′ ∈ (0, Y ]. By (18)
it follows that the set I = {y ∈ (0, Y )| ψ(y) = 0} has positive measure. Define
y1 = inf I and y2 = sup I. I claim that in fact I = [y1, y2], i.e., I is a closed
interval. For suppose not. Then there exists y′ ∈ [y1, y2] such that ψ(y′) > 0.
By continuity, ψ(y) must actually be positive on some neighbourhood of y′;
this implies y′ 6= y1, y′ 6= y2 and hence y′ ∈ (y1, y2). One may therefore define
y¯1 = sup I ∩ [0, y′] and y¯2 = inf I ∩ [y′, Y ], and one has y¯1 < y¯2. For y ∈ (y¯1, y¯2),
one has ψ(y) > 0, hence, by (18),
c(y¯2) = c(y¯1) + y¯2 − y¯1. (A.41)
Next I note that, again by (18), at any y ∈ I, the function ψ(.) has a
minimum and satisfies dψdy = 0. By (17) in conjunction with the fact that c(y) > 0
for all y, this implies that
u′′(c(y))G(y) + µg(y) = 0 (A.42)
for all y ∈ I. For the given utility function and distribution function, it follows
that
c(y) = cˆ(y, µ) where (A.43)
cˆ(y, µ) = (1− δ)
(
y
µ
) 1
2−δ
(A.44)
for all y ∈ I. By continuity, one has ψ(y¯i) = 0, hence y¯i ∈ I for i = 1, 2. From
(A.43), one then has
c(y¯i) = cˆ(y¯i, µ) (A.45)
for i = 1, 2. From (A.41) and (A.45), it follows that there is some y′′ ∈ (y¯1, y¯2)
such that
∂cˆ
∂y
(y′′, µ) = 1. (A.46)
Given that the function cˆ(., µ) is strictly concave, (A.46) implies
∂cˆ
∂y
(y, µ) > 1 (A.47)
for all y ≤ y¯1. From (16), (A.45), and (A.46) one then obtains
c(y) ≥ c(y¯1)− y¯1 + y
> cˆ(y¯1, µ)−
∫ y¯1
y
∂cˆ
∂y
(y, µ)dy
= cˆ(y, µ) (A.48)
for all y < y¯1. In view of (A.44), (A.48) implies u′′(c(y))G(y) + µg(y) 6= 0
and hence, by (17), that dψdy 6= 0 for all y < y¯1. Given that ψ(y¯1) = 0, this
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is incompatible with the transversality condition (20) requiring that ψ(0) = 0.
The assumption that the set I = {y ∈ (0, Y )| ψ(y) = 0} is not a closed interval
[y1, y2] has thus led to a contradiction and must be false.
Given that I = [y1, y2], the argument just given shows that c(.) satisfies
(A.43) and (A.44) and hence (27) on [y1, y2]. Since limy→0 ∂cˆ∂y (y, µ) = ∞, it
follows that y1 > 0. For y ∈ (0, y1), ψ(y) > 0 and hence by (18), dcdy = 1.
Finally, Proposition 4 implies that y2 < Y. For y ∈ (y2, Y ], ψ(y) > 0 and hence,
again by (18), dcdy = 1. This shows that c(.) also satisfies (26) and completes the
proof of Proposition 8.
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